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An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and
Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship
Stephen M. Feldman 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2351 (2001)
Modernist legal writers, including Dennis Arrow in his
well-known Pomobabble article, commonly criticize postmod-
ern legal scholars for being muddle-headed nihilistic thinkers
who write indecipherable jargon-filled nonsense and lack po-
litical convictions. Professor Feldman responds to these and
other related criticisms and, in doing so, explains some key
components of postmodernism. For instance, he describes how
the pervasiveness of postmodern culture infuses legal scholar-
ship with certain postmodern themes. Ironically, then, even the
most vehement critics, like Arrow, display a surprising if un-
witting affinity for postmodernism. Finally, in order to deflect
precipitate denunciations of postmodernism, Professor
Feldman suggests a refinement of terms, dividing postmodern-
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[Hie whom love touches not walks in darkness.'
In two recent articles, published respectively in the Michi-
gan and Texas Law Reviews, Dennis W. Arrow aimed his bow and
launched a feathered shaft at the heart of postmodern legal schol-
arship. 2 The point of his arrow, though, was surprisingly equivocal.
Without doubt, he intended his arrow to be a weapon. He sought to
attack and maybe even to kill postmodernism. Yet, an arrow fired
at the heart can also have a very different meaning. If shot by Cu-
* Professor of Law and Associate Member of Political Science, University of Tulsa. I thank
Richard Delgado, Doug Litowitz, Jay Mootz, Pierre Schlag, Mark Tushnet, and Marty Beisky for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Dennis Arrow for his letter, which in its
very style, reinforced my desire to publish this Essay.
1. PLATO, The Symposium, in PLATO, THE REPUBLIc AND OTHER WORKS 317, 341 (Benja-
min Jowett trans., Anchor Books 1973).
2. Dennis W. Arrow, Ponmbabble. Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for
the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997) [hereinafter Arrow, Pomobabble]; Dennis W. Arrow,
"Rich," "'Textured," and "Nuanced Constitutional "Scholarship" and Constitutional Messianism
at the Millennium, 78 TEX. L. REV. 149 (1999) [hereinafter Arrow, Nuanced]. Arrow wrote the
second article largely in response to Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Legal Scholarship at the Cross-




pid, the arrow signifies love.3 And indeed, I argue, Arrow's writing
reveals a deep affinity with postmodern scholarship, regardless of
his explicit purposes. His work can fairly be categorized as a mani-
festation of postmodernism, or perhaps more precisely, of either
pseudo-postmodernism or just bad postmodernismA
Arrow raises explicitly and implicitly the modernist criti-
cisms that are most often leveled against postmodern legal schol-
ars, though Arrow does so in an unusual fashion. If Arrow and the
other critics were to be believed, postmodernists are muddle-headed
thinkers who write indecipherable jargon-filled nonsense. Even
worse, they are irresponsible nihilists who lack political convic-
tions. If this characterization of postmodernism were accurate,
however, why would anyone be a postmodernist? I wouldn't. In-
stead, I would do whatever I could to defeat postmodernism.
Yet I do consider myself to be a type of postmodernist.5 The
criticisms of postmodernism are unpersuasive because the modern-
ist depiction of postmodern legal thought is seriously inaccurate. It
is little more than a caricature. The modernists, in other words, are
imprecise and downright wrong. Now, some of the critics, including
Arrow, might be smiling and thinking their response: "Aha! You
can't even use the word 'wrong' without contradicting yourself be-
cause, after all, you're a postmodernist. And postmodernism repu-
diates concepts like truth and falsity, and rightness and wrongness.
And precision? How can a postmodernist demand precision with a
straight face?"
But this modernist response is precisely the problem. The
typical modernist characterization of postmodernism-as rejecting
all conceptions of rightness, goodness, and judgment-is wrong.
And I use that word again purposefully to stress that concepts like
truth and falsity, rightness and wrongness, and so forth, are en-
3. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 92-100 (1942) (retelling the story of Cupid).
4. For an explanation and description of postmodern legal thought, see STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 137-87 (2000) [hereinafter FELDMAN, VOYAGE].
5. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship
and Judicial Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Cor-
pus Cases), 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1046 (1994) [hereinafter Feldman, Diagnosing]; Stephen M.
Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEo. L.J. 2243
(1993) [hereinafter Feldman, Persistence]; Stephen M. Feldman, Playing With the Pieces: Post-
modernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151 (1999) [hereinafter Feldman, Playing];
Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1996)
[hereinafter Feldman, Politics].
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tirely consistent with postmodernism. Indeed, to me, postmodern-
ism explains how we understand such concepts in the first place.
Part I of this Essay describes, as best as possible, Arrow's
and related criticisms of postmodern legal scholarship. 6 In most in-
stances, when my goal is to critique another scholar's corpus, I be-
gin by describing as accurately and fairly as possible that person's
work.7 In Arrow's case, however, doing so is difficult. His first arti-
cle to focus on postmodernism, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak
and Constitutional 'Meaning" for the Uninitiated, is a relentless
parodic satire of postmodern legal scholarship that stretches on for
an incredible 230 pages. His second article, 'ich," "Textured," and
"Nuanced".- Constitutional "Scholarship" and Constitutional Messi-
anism at the Millennium, is mostly a defense of the first piece
rather than a sustained clarification or elaboration of his position.
Thus, despite the page length of Arrow's Pomobabble piece, my
summary of his position will be rather brief, though I supplement it
by drawing on other critics of postmodern legal scholarship. Part II
responds to the various criticisms of postmodern legal scholarship,
and in the course of doing so, Part II sketches some key postmodern
themej.8 Part III, the conclusion, explains Arrow's affinity for
postmodernism. The pervasiveness of postmodern culture some-
times influences even modernist critics to manifest postmodern
themes. Finally, Part III suggests a refinement of terms, dividing
postmodernists into two groups, antimodernists and metamodern-
ists.9
I. THE CRITIQUE OF POSTMODERN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The nature of Arrow's Pomobabble article is immediately
evident. The text does not even begin until the third page of the ar-
ticle and a total of only six lines of text appear within the first ten
pages of the piece because the epigraphs and the initial footnotes
are so exhaustingly long. When the reader finally reaches the text,
it goes as follows:
I (the "subject") have (has) at various ("different") times ("moments") con(side)red
(presup(posed)) writing (sharing "discourse" pertaining to) an article ("text") "de-
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See, e.g., Feldman, Persistence, supra note 5, at 169-73, 192-97 (criticizing Frank
Michelman's civic republican constitutional jurisprudence); Feldman. Playing, supra note 5. at
164-69 (critiquing Pierre Schlag's work); Feldman, Politics, supra note 5. at 2246-58 (critiquing
the works of both Dennis Patterson and J.M. Balkin).
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
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fining" (destroying) porno ("postmodernist" and "legal postmodernist") jargon
("signs") for the "uninitiated" (unhip dullairds [sic]). I was afraid it wouldn't be
very "good"-and that it might even be " 'good' "-but took comfort from Richard
Delgado's reassuring observation that Randall Kennedy's insistence on merit in le-
gal scholarship was "potentially hostile to the idea of voice."' 0
Okay? Had enough? No? Well, don't worry; Arrow has just
begun. He continues: "Had I 'cannily' composed such an article, it
might have played something like an extended version of this
.... -11 Arrow then launches into his definitions of key postmodern
terms, all of which are, of course, constructed for the maximum sa-
tiric effect, thus supposedly poking fun at postmodern legal schol-
ars. The first term, for instance, is "absence of fault," which he de-
fines as an "empirically verifiable real fact: except for 'I's', of course;
see generally 'determinism,' 'essence,' 'victimology,' 'power para-
digm.' "12 This and similar definitions constitute the bulk of the
text, but the larger part of the article, by far, lies in the footnotes,
which also parody postmodern writing. The footnotes have been
aptly described as in a "stream-of-consciousness style . ..with a
great many literary references.""8 Here is one small example, lifted
from footnote fourteen, which stretches in its entirety over three pages:
See also infra note 29 (quoting Oscar Wilde recommending deployment of visual
art as haberdashery); Tolstoy, supra note 12, at 39 (discussing Charles Darwin's
view that "[t]he origin of the art of music is the call of the males to the females");
infra note 67 (contemplating, inter alia, seduction); James Shreeve, Music of the
Hemispheres, DISCOVER, Oct. 1996, at 90, 98 (same); id. at 99 ("Most people
[are] ... emotionally responsive to music throughout their lives ... Herbert von
Karajan once had a pulse meter attached while conducting Beethoven's Lenora
Overture; his pulse rate peaked not in the passages during which he exerted the
most physical effort but in those that emotionally moved him most."). But cf. H.T.
Lowe-Porter, Translator's Note to Mann, supra note 2, at v ("[Miusic, and talk
about it, uses an exact and international language."); Vincent Tomas, Introduction
to Tolstoy, supra note 12, at vii, xiv ("Carroll C. Pratt and Suzanne K.
Langer ... agree with Tolstoy that music is a language of emotions, [but] make
[the] sense of expression, rather than Tolstoy's notion of infection, fundamental in
their theories of art.").1
4
If one tries to restate Arrow's critical point in more straight-
forward terms, he seems to be saying that the style or method of
postmodern legal scholarship is ludicrous. Consider Arrow's use of
footnotes. The greater part of the article is in the footnotes, yet Ar-
row fills them with largely unconnected and arbitrary references to
10. Arrow, Pomobabble, supra note 2, at 463-72 (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. at 473-74 (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 475.
13. Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 323.
14. Arrow, Pomobabble, supra note 2, at 474-75 n.14.
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famous literary figures who have, at most, tenuous connections to
law and jurisprudence. The footnotes, then, provide straightforward
parody. Arrow is suggesting that the footnotes in postmodern legal
scholarship resemble his notes. They are indecipherable references
to fancy thinkers who shed little light on the law. They represent
stylistic posturing by weak scholars with nothing to say.
In fact, his unceasing ridicule of postmodern style suggests
that, in Arrow's opinion, postmodern writers use this style to hide
an underlying vacuity. If one digs beneath the pomobabble verbal-
isms, then one finds... ? Nothing, or so Arrow would have us be-
lieve. Postmodern legal scholarship is all style-bad style at that-
and no substance. Now, perhaps, we can see a more (albeit not very)
subtle parodic point in Arrow's footnotes. He is demonstrating (or
denigrating) postmodern scholarship not only with the content (or
lack of content) in his footnotes but also with the construction of the
notes vis-A-vis the text. Arrow is trying to demonstrate, in satiric
fashion, a postmodern deconstructive reversal of a binary opposi-
tion.
Many postmodernists emphasize how concepts often seem to
appear in binary oppositions or, in other words, opposed pairs. We
can talk about objectivity versus subjectivity, rules versus stan-
dards, order versus chaos, and so forth. In these opposed pairs,
postmodernists argue, one side often is privileged in relation to the
other. In the legal realm, for instance, objectivity usually is privi-
leged over subjectivity. A judge who is supposedly objective is
deemed good, while a judge who is subjective is bad. Postmodern
deconstructionists frequently attempt to demonstrate that the ordi-
nary privileging within a binary opposition can be reversed. So, for
instance, judicial subjectivity might be shown to be preferable to
objectivity in some instances. The deconstructive point is not to re-
verse the privileging permanently, but rather, in part, to suggest
the instability and contingency of the usual privileging.15
An opposition readily apparent in law review writing is text
versus footnotes, with the text being privileged over the footnotes.
The text not only literally resides above the footnotes on the page,
but the text is supposed to be the focus of the reader's attention.
The footnotes are only secondary, supporting the privileged text.
Arrow, then, illustrates postmodern method or style by, in effect,
deconstructing this privileging of text over footnotes. He does so by
15. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 743 (1987) (ex-
plaining deconstruction as a method); see, e.g., J.ML Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics
of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1613 (1990) (deconstructing a Supreme Court case).
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reversing the normal ordering: he privileges the footnotes over the
text. The reader's attention is supposed to focus primarily on the
notes, with only occasional glances at the secondary text. Indeed, on
many, if not most, of the pages in the article there is no text, only
footnotes. 16 So, perhaps, Arrow has another point to make about
postmodern legal writing: the text itself is, like in Arrow's parody,
empty of content. Not only are the footnotes pure style, but the text
is not saying anything at all anyway. Postmodern 'scholarship, in
both the text and the footnotes, is devoid of meaningful content.
Of course, when it comes to criticisms of postmodern scholar-
ship, this point is not particularly original. Ronald Dworkin, for
instance, maintains that postmodernists present their views as
mere "subjective displays in which we need take nothing but a bio-
graphical interest."' 7 Brian Leiter denounces "postmodernists and
deconstructionists" for their "sophomoric jargon."' 8 Robin West
claims that "as a tool of analysis deconstruction has all the useful-
ness of an unhinged steering wheel in avoiding a collision with a
wall." 9 Indeed, many critics declare that postmodernism is even
worse than useless: it might produce dire results. A common ploy is
to maintain that postmodernism engenders political quiescence.
Witness Catharine MacKinnon's alarmist pronouncement: "I do
know this: we cannot have this postmodernism and still have a
meaningful practice of women's human rights, far less a women's
movement."20 Jay P. Moran worries, meanwhile, that "postmodern
principles threaten to undermine the Western legal system."'" Fi-
nally, the coup de grace for the modernist critics occurs with the
pronouncement that postmodernism is already over. Gary Pavela,
for one, has declared that "postmodernism as we used to know it is
dead."22 Arrow, too, makes this rhetorical move, proclaiming that
16. See, e.g., Arrow, Pomobabble, supra note 2, at 509-38. Indeed, on one page, the line
separating the non-existent text from the footnotes contains the question, "Is the text hegemoni.
cally privileged over the footnotes?" Id. at 470.
17. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87,
88 (1996).
18. Brian Leiter, Books in Review, ABA DIVISION FOR PUB. EDUC. Focus ON L. STUD., Fall
1998, at 14, 14.
19. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 204 (1997).
20. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687,
710 (2000).
21. Jay P. Moran, Postmodernism's Misguided Place in Legal Scholarship: Chaos Theory,
Deconstruction, and Some Insights from Thomas Pynchon's Fiction, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.F.
155, 159 (1997).
22. Gary Pavela, Applying the Power of Association on Campus: A Model Code of Academic
Integrity, 24 J.C. & U.L. 97, 102 (1997).
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"postmodernism has become an academic joke even before the dawn
of the millennium."
23
II. CRITICIZING THE CRITICS OF POSTMIODERN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
The most obvious problem with the various criticisms of
postmodernism is the wild inconsistency. How can a theory or
jurisprudential approach that is bereft of meaningful content un-
dermine the Western legal system? How can a movement that is
already over and done lead to political quiescence? In fact, why
bother criticizing postmodernism if it is already a joke?
Even given this problem of logical inconsistency, a perhaps
larger difficulty looms. Most critics of postmodernism share at least
one trait in common: a willingness to categorize and denounce de-
construction and postmodernism while expending little effort to un-
derstand and analyze postmodern writings. In the 1980s, the label
"liberal" was used as a political showstopper. If one's views were
called liberal, they would immediately be dismissed, without fur-
ther analysis. Many modernist writers want to do the same with
the label "postmodern." As soon as somebody is called postmodern,
then her writings can be categorically denounced as either nihilis-
tic, relativistic, idealistic, useless, worse than useless, or all of the
above. 24 We find scholars as eminent as Richard Posner precipi-
tately attributing astoundingly absurd positions to postmodernists,
such as the claim that "racism is a bad dream from which we may
awake at any time."25 In fact, the modernists' habit of heedlessly
23. Arrow, Nuanced, supra note 2, at 168. Moran writes: "At best, postmodern ideology has
served as a sort of fetish to engage the creative energies of a relatively small group of scholars in
the legal academy." Moran, supra note 21, at 157.
24. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, The Postinodern Infiltration of Legal Scholarship, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1504, 1527 (2000) (reviewing PAUL NV. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999) and
JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE (1999)) (denouncing "postmodern po-
mobabble"); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts
at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 305,
310 (2000) (labeling it nihilistic and useless, because postmodernists criticize without offering
workable alternatives); MacKinnon, supra note 20, at 700-01 (idealism); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1994)
(nihilism and relativism).
25. Richard A. Posner, The Law of the Beholder, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 2000, at 49, 50
(reviewing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000)). Occasion-
ally, one does find a modernist critique of postmodernism that actually tries to focus on postmod-
ern writings. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. LITowrrz, POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW (1997) (criti-
cizing postmodernism from the perspective of analytic philosophy); Ian Crosby, Note, Worlds in
Stone: Gadamer, Heidegger, and Originalism, 76 TEX. L. REV. 849 (1998) (criticizing the
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denouncing postmodernism helps explain the inconsistency among
their various criticisms. A modernist who denigrates postmodern-
ism with inflammatory insults is unlikely to contemplate the under-
lying substance or logical implications of those insults.
Arrow has characterized his Pomobabble article as a parody
and satire. 26 Maybe so. But it is also mean-spirited. Arrow often
slides across the line from parody to mockery. Like the other critics,
he makes little effort to represent postmodernism accurately and to
analyze it fairly from a critical standpoint. Whereas most critics,
however, categorically denounce and expeditiously dismiss post-
modernism, Arrow instead mocks postmodern scholarship by pre-
tending to use a postmodern or pseudo-postmodern style that is so
grotesque that it demands ridicule. He resembles the bully who
teases the outcast on the playground by mocking her distinctive
physical or personality traits, while all the time encouraging others
to join in the "fun." Arrow, it seems, is the one who laughs at others
because they sound or look different, without thinking that there
might be some substance beneath the sounds and the looks. And
Arrow wants others to join him in the mockery, to castigate post-
modern scholarship for being "laughable." Arrow's technique is, to
me, most distasteful. Ronald J. Krotoszynski was correct to de-
nounce Arrow's arguments as ad hominem. 27
Yet, the danger remains that many readers will accept not
only the common categorical denunciations but also Arrow's mock-
ery of postmodernism. Without further examination of postmodern
writing, readers might believe that postmodern legal scholarship is
nihilistic and potentially dangerous nonsense, or the insipid gibber-
ish that Arrow depicts. Thus, for the sake of scholarly precision and
clarity, it is important to respond to the substance of criticisms
made by Arrow and others.
For instance, the claim that postmodern legal scholars can-
not be political advocates is so inaccurate as to be outrageous. No-
tice, first, that this claim-that postmodernism leads to political
quiescence-intertwines with the argument that postmodernism is
empty of content. If postmodernism is merely a matter of style,
without substance, then there supposedly is no basis for taking a
political stance. But contrary to this criticism, many postmodern-
ists, especially deconstructionists, are overtly political. Indeed, one
Gadamerian critique of foundationalism). Outside of jurisprudence, a sustained examination of
deconstructive postmodernism is in JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989).
26. Arrow, Nuanced, supra note 2, at 153.
27. Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 322.
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could fairly characterize deconstruction as being primarily con-
cerned with justice. By demonstrating the illegitimate privileging
within binary oppositions, deconstructionists uncover the marginal-
ized Other. That is, deconstructionists reveal that certain view-
points, values, interests, individuals, and traditions are either ig-
nored, denied, or oppressed in the name of the privileged. Jacques
Derrida has gone so far as to declare that "[d]econstruction is jus-
tice."28 Partly for that reason, many postmodern legal scholars have
expressly addressed the problem of justice.
29
Thus, if one were to do little more than glance at the writ-
ings of postmodern critical race scholars, such as Richard Delgado
and Ian F. Haney L6pez, their political goal practically flashes in
neon: they seek social justice for racial minorities. 30 In the debates
over anti-hate speech regulations, for example, opponents of the
regulations attempt to seize a dominant or privileged position by
invoking the First Amendment. Their desire, as they so often
stress, is to uphold the sanctity of freedom of speech. On the other
side, proponents of the regulations, such as Delgado, attempt to de-
construct the dominant position as free speech absolutism. They
maintain that this type of absolutism tends to ignore the interests
and views of the hate-speech victims, who usually belong to societal
minorities or outgroups.3 *
Once again, I can practically hear Arrow exclaiming, "What
hogwash! What about the postmodern critique of normativeness?
Doesn't that postmodern nonsense preclude any claims to justice or
social change?" Well, to be sure, postmodern legal scholars, led by
Pierre Schlag, have questioned the effectiveness of traditional nor-
mative legal scholarship, which still fills the pages of most law re-
views and has done so for more than a century.32 When confronted
28. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 919, 945 (1990).
29. See J.M Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1131 (1994); Feldman, Politics, supra note 5, at 192-201; Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring for De-
construction, 12 YALE J.L. & FErINISM 85, 12841 (2000).
30. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L REV. 1258 (1992); Ian
F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.I.-C.L. L REV. 1 (1994).
31. For an illustration of these opposed positions, see the exchange between Steven G. Gey
and Richard Delgado, published in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. See Steven G.
Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L REV. 193 (1996); Richard
Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L REV.
865 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Postmodern Censorship Revisited: A Reply to Richard Delgado, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1077 (1998).
32. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L REV. 167 (1990).
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with some specified legal or social problem, modernist authors usu-
ally respond by analyzing a series of cases, statutes, or both that
seem relevant to the problem. Then the author typically concludes
with a normative recommendation: she recommends that the Su-
preme Court adopt some new or modified doctrinal framework or
that Congress enact or amend some statute that will supposedly
resolve the problem. Indeed, to some modernists, such a normative
recommendation is the sine qua non of "serious scholarship." 33
Postmodernists generally refrain from making such explicit
proposals for social and legal change and thus repudiate this type of
normative scholarship.3 4 Most important, postmodernists argue
that normative scholarship is misleadingly out-of-touch with social
reality. Normative scholars write as if their recommendations can
and will be anxiously read and quickly implemented by the Court or
Congress, as if remedying the world's problems were that easy. But,
of course, it is not. As many commentators have noted, for example,
a growing gulf lies between the legal academy and the judiciary.3 5
This chasm is not due merely to the fact that postmodern scholars
refrain from making normative recommendations in their articles,
since there are hundreds of normative articles still being published
every year. If judges wanted input from the professoriate, there is
no shortage of free advice being offered. But most judges, appar-
ently, do not want it. They are not listening. Thus the overwhelm-
ing majority of normative articles are published stillborn: they not
only fail to achieve their self-stated goal of directly influencing the
development of the law, but they do not even get read by judges or
legislators.
Although many postmodern legal scholars normally refrain
from writing traditional normative articles, they are not politically
apathetic. Rather, they often are politically motivated and write in
the hope that their words might influence others. Yet they seek to
33. Austin, supra note 24, at 1507.
34. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997) (offering a critical history of
the separation of church and state that does not conclude by recommending any particular doc.
trinal change) [hereinafter FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS].
35. See Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Em.
pirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (emphasizing,
from the perspective of a federal judge, a disjunction between law professors and judges); Pierre
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 871-72 (1991) (stating that
judges do not listen to or care about legal scholarship). For examples of Supreme Court Justices
denigrating the legal academy, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis.
senting); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion).
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intervene in legal and social problems, to struggle for legal and so-
cial transformation, through techniques other than the overt rec-
ommendation of change. After all, if such recommendations are in-
efficacious, why bother making them? Most postmodernists believe
that a more effective scholarly approach is to uncover and disrupt
any illegitimate assumptions or premises that tacitly undergird
current social and legal arrangements. Schlag's efforts to change
the practice of legal scholarship by ending (or reducing the volume
of) normative legal scholarship is a good example of this type of
postmodern writing. His method is to disrupt the assumption that
law review authors and rdaders are "relatively autonomous
selves," 36 powerful centers of social power who can readily trans-
form the world merely because they wish to do so.37
To be sure, this type of postmodern deconstructive writing is
not easily done, or at least not easily done well. The difficulty arises
because our preexisting assumptions, which derive from our com-
munal or cultural traditions, provide the springboard for communi-
cation with others. Our traditions and our concomitant assumptions
open us to the possibility of meaning and understanding in the first
place. 38 Put simply, we never communicate in a cultural void. We
are always already situated in some cultural context, and that con-
text is therefore necessarily the starting point for all communica-
tion, whether speaking, writing, listening, or reading. For this rea-
son, then, any speech or writing that is aligned or consistent with
our preexisting assumptions is likely to seem persuasive or sensi-
ble. Such speech or writing makes sense at least partly because it
fits with our preconceived notions-our assumptions and premises.
So when a postmodern deconstructionist attempts to disrupt those
very assumptions and premises, she is struggling up river, fighting
against the current. Any speech or writing that denies the accepted
36. See Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO.
L.J. 37 (1987).
37. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L REv. 1627 (1991).
38. Hans.Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneulical Problem (David Linge
trans.), in JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 128, 133 (1980). Gadamer writes:
This formulation certainly does not mean that we are enclosed within a wall of
prejudices and only let through the narrow portals those things that can pro-
duce a pass saying, 'Nothing new will be said here.' Instead we welcome just
that guest who promises something new to our curiosity. But how do we know
the guest whom we admit is one who has something new to say to us? Is not our
expectation and our readiness to hear the new also necessarily determined by
the old that has already taken possession of us?
Id.; see Stephen K. Feldman, Made for Each Other: The Interdependence of Deconstruction and




cultural traditions or questions the preexisting assumptions is
likely to seem unreasonable, confused, offensive, or even absurd,
precisely because it does not fit our preconceived notions. 3 9
What about the other modernist criticisms of postmodern le-
gal scholarship? Many of the modernists' favorite denunciatory la-
bels for postmodern legal scholarship-nihilism, idealism, relativ-
ism, and so on-seem interrelated. Moreover, these dismissive cate-
gorizations are based on a serious misunderstanding. Contrary to
modernist assertions, most postmodernists do not maintain that,
when it comes to textual interpretation, for example, "anything
goes." 40 Rather, postmodernists tend to explain how our positions-
our situatedness or embeddedness-in communal or cultural tradi-
tions both enable and constrain communication. We never are free-
floating subjects who arbitrarily assign meanings to texts. Instead,
as already discussed, we are always situated within a cultural con-
text that engenders certain assumptions and premises. Texts have
meaning, values have substance, and justice has content, exactly
because we participate in our cultural traditions. In other words,
postmodern theory explains why we are not relegated to those mod-
ernist bugaboos: nihilism, idealism, and relativism.
Postmodernists, therefore, can and do talk about rightness,
goodness, legitimacy, knowledge, and so forth.41 What most post-
modernists repudiate, though, is the modernist claim to objectivity.
Modernists insist that if we are to able to talk of truth and knowl-
edge, then our propositions must somehow correspond to some ob-
jective reality. It is the object in the real world that provides the
foundation for truth and knowledge. 42 Postmodernists respond,
39. As I have written elsewhere:
[T]o perform [postmodern] critical activity proves often to be a formidable chal-
lenge. It requires the writer somehow to disrupt the reader's basic and deep-
seated assumptions-assumptions that typically emerge from a dominant cul-
ture and that have been inculcated and reinforced for much (or all) of the
reader's life. This type of critical work, to be effective, often requires more
imagination and originality than a straightforward prescription for change,
which one would see in traditional theory.
Stephen M. Feldman, How to Be Critical, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 911 (2000).
40. JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION 110 (1982); Madeleine Plasencia, Who's
Afraid of Humpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist References in Judicial Opinions, 21 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 215, 247 (1997).
41. See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT (1992) (discussing decon.
struction and ethical relations); J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Jus.
tice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131 (1994) (discussing justice); Feldman, Politics, supra note 5, at 192-
201 (discussing justice); Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?,
68 WASH. L. REV. 249 (1993) (discussing the rule of law).
42. John Searle, for instance, writes that "there is a reality that exists totally independently
of us, an observer-independent way that things are, and our statements about that reality are
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however, with two general arguments. First, modernists have never
successfully explained how we manage to bridge the gap between
the modernist self or subject and that external objective world. 43
Second, postmodernists maintain that they have explained, as dis-
cussed above, how we actually have truth and knowledge. Truth
and knowledge exist not because of correspondence with objective
reality, but rather because we exist within communal and cultural
traditions that enable us to communicate with each other.
44
If my depiction of postmodernism is accurate, then why do so
many modernists mischaracterize it? One reason is simple: some
(though not all) modernists occasionally do slipshod scholarship.
They might, for instance, present grossly misleading characteriza-
tions of other writers, or cite specific articles or authors for proposi-
tions that are difficult to justify-if one reads the cited article or
author fairly and in context. This problem is reminiscent of the
celebrated law review dispute between Roscoe Pound and Karl Lle-
wellyn. In 1931, Pound wrote an article attacking Llewellyn and
other American legal realists.45 Llewellyn responded in an article
demonstrating that Pound's characterization of the realists, point
after point after point, was strikingly inaccurate. 46 Indeed, after
reading Llewellyn's article, one is left with the impression that
Pound at most had skimmed a few realist articles. 47 And of course,
true or false depending on whether they accurately represent how things are.' JOHN R. SEARLE,
MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY 134 (1998).
43. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (discuss-
ing how modernist philosophers have struggled to explain how external reality is mirrored in the
individual's consciousness).
44. Postmodernists are, in effect, indifferent to objective reality. Whereas modernists devote
enormous time and energy to questions revolving around the existence of an external world and
our knowledge of it, postmodernists generally disregard these questions. Postmodernists thus do
not necessarily claim that an external world does not exist. Rather, they claim that to the extent
that there is an external world, it is meaningful only through our hermeneutic being-in-the-
world.
MacKinnon, therefore, misses the point when she writes: "The postmodern attack on univer-
sality also proves a bit too much. Inconveniently, the fact of death is a universal-approaching
100%. Whatever it means, however it is related-to culturally and spiritually, whatever happens
after it, it happens." MacKinnon, supra note 20, at 698. To suggest that death is some type of
raw meaningless physical event in an external world is absurd. Death is obviously a meaningful
event. Does death mean non-existence? Does it mean joinder with God? Does it mean ascension
to heaven? One cannot speak or think of death without the concept having some sort of meaning.
Postmodernists would be concerned with the social construction of these various meanings.
45. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L REV. 697 (1931).
46. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
47. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 72-75 (1995) (discussing
the Pound-Llewellyn exchange); N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLE%,ELLYN:
2001] 2363
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Pound's superficial and imprecise understanding of realism had
facilitated his attack. It is always easier to criticize a caricature
rather than a reasonable depiction of one's opponent.
Like Pound vis-A-vis the realists, Arrow misrepresents the
work of postmodernists for his own scholarly convenience. To choose
one glaring example, Arrow repeatedly mischaracterizes my writing
(which was of unusual importance, at least to this writer). Arrow
describes me as a "one-trick pony," apparently because I have writ-
ten several articles on the subject of postmodernism. 48 Well, indis-
putably, I have written numerous articles on postmodernism, par-
ticularly on its manifestation in legal scholarship and judicial prac-
tice.49 Indeed, I am writing another one right now. But just as
surely, I also have written extensively on other subjects, such as
the separation of church and state and the history of American ju-
risprudence. 50 Arrow either was unaware of these other writings,
because of inadequate research, or he ignored it so that he could
intentionally mischaracterize my writing for his parodic purposes.
Similarly, in his Pomobabble piece, Arrow repeatedly cites one of
my articles, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholar-
ship and Judicial Practice, for the proposition that " 'postmodern-
ism denies the possibility of its own definition.' "51 I do not deny
writing that phrase; in fact, I admit it. Nonetheless, and unfortu-
nately for Arrow, in the context of Diagnosing Power, which was
published in 1994, that proposition illustrated the postmodern con-
cern for paradoxes. 52 Much of the remainder of the article, in fact,
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997) (offering a book-length historical study of
Pound and Llewellyn's relationship).
48. Specifically, Arrow writes: "So while some one-trick ponies (apparently oblivious to the
fact that postmodernism has become an academic joke even before the dawn of the millennium)
are likely to soldier on as if nothing has happened, others have searched for new sub-fields to
politicize." Arrow, Nuanced, supra note 2, at 167-68 (citing Feldman, Playing, supra note 5).
49. See, e.g., Persistence, supra note 5; Feldman, Playing, supra note 5; Feldman, Politics,
supra note 5; Feldman. Besides, my impression is that many scholars believe such specialization
to be a virtue.
50. See, e.g., FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 4 (tracing the history of American legal
thought); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS, supra note 34
(tracing the history of the separation of church and state); Stephen M. Feldman, Critical Ques.
tions in Law and Religion: An Introduction, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 1
(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (providing introductory essay to anthology on the separation of
church and state); Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence:
The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1997) (focusing on nineteenth-century American
legal thought).
51. Arrow, Pomobabble, supra note 2, at 470 n.10, 485 n.22, 510 n.29 (citing Feldman, Di-
agnosing, supra note 5, at 1048).
52. I wrote: "Postmodernism immediately presents a paradox. Postmodernism exists and
even structures its own reproduction, yet postmodernism denies the possibility of its own defini-
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focused on the elucidation of various postmodern themes, including
the concern for paradoxes. 53 Thus, one point of Diagnosing Power
was that, while postmodernism cannot be reduced to a simple con-
cise definition, it nonetheless is animated by several themes that
can be specified and explained. In other words, that article directly
contradicts Arrow's Pomobabble view: postmodernism is not non-
sensical gobbledygook. To the contrary, as with premodernism and
modernism, postmodernism can be explained with detail and clar-
ity.54
Unsurprisingly, then, if one fairly reads postmodern legal
writing to an appreciable extent, one discovers that Arrow's parody
does not even remotely resemble most (if not all) of the scholarship.
Postmodern authors such as J.M. Balkin, who has written exten-
sively on postmodern culture and law, 55 or Francis J. Mootz, who
has explored the implications of Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophi-
cal hermeneutics for jurisprudence,56 or Tracy Higgins, who has
tion. Indeed, this paradox illustrates one recurrent aspect or theme of postmodernism: the recog-
nition, exploration, and even celebration of the existence of various paradoxes" Feldman, Diag-
nosing, supra note 5, at 1048.
53. See id. at 1074-1105.
54. I am, apparently, not the only person who believes that postmodernism can be explained
and therefore understood clearly. In a recent review of my book on the history of American juris-
prudence, including postmodern legal thought, a state judge concluded. "After reading this book,
make no mistake, one knows what postmodernism is and what postmodern jurisprudence is all
about." Jerry L. Goodman, A Review of "American Legal Thought From Premodernism to Post-
modernism," 36 TULSA L.J. 231, 234 (2000); see FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 4, at 137-87 (ex-
plaining the emergence and themes of postmodern legal scholarship). For a brief yet clear sum-
mary of postmodernism, see Douglas Litowitz, In Defense of Postmodernism, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 39
(2000).
Arrow also criticizes one of my articles for citing ten of my "prior works on the subject [of
postmodernism] 30 times in a 30-page essay." Arrow, Nuanced, supra note 2, at 168 n.102 (citing
Feldman, Playing, supra note 5). I confess: I am guilty-if it is a crime to cite oneself rather than
to repeat arguments at length that one has previously explained. Moreover, self-citation obvi-
ously is in part a marketing device intended primarily for student editors at elite law journals. In
effect, I send a message to these editors stating that my manuscript submission should be seri-
ously considered because I have published previously in elite journals. To those readers who
might care, therefore, I admit that I care about which journal publishes my writing. For what its
worth, though, I do not believe that I am the only author, postmodern or modern, who commits
the crime (or sin?) of self-citation. For example, Arrow himself, in his second article criticizing
postmodernism, cites his own first article on the subject, Pomobabble, a remarkable 34 times!
See Arrow, Nuanced, supra note 2 (citing Arrow, Pomobabble, supra note 2, throughout).
55. See J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 licH. L REv. 1966
(1992).
56. See Francis J. Mootz III, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed
Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur 68 B.U. L REV. 523
(1988).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
elaborated postmodern themes within a feminist context,5 7 or Den-
nis Patterson, who has developed a postmodern Wittgensteinian
approach to law, 58 are models of clarity, precision, and imagination
that any legal scholar would do well to emulate. To be sure, I have
disagreed with some of their positions, 59 but I would never claim
that they had not presented them strongly and clearly. Even so, I
do not mean to suggest that all postmodernists are good writers.
Some are maddeningly muddled and obscure. But postmodernists
do not have a monopoly on poor writing. A few modernists, I ven-
ture, would fall into this category as well.
Apart from careless scholarship, another causal factor helps
explain why so many modernists inaccurately depict postmodern-
ism. This cause might be characterized as more systemic and thus
more difficult to overcome than merely bad scholarship. The prob-
lem is as follows: modernists tend to see the world from their mod-
ernist vantage. No surprise there, certainly, but it nonetheless en-
genders problems when modernists attempt to describe postmod-
ernists. Why? Because modernists tend to portray postmodernists
in modernist terms or categories, which the postmodernists tend to
repudiate. 60
Whereas postmodernists often attempt to deconstruct binary
oppositions, such as objectivity versus subjectivity, modernists tend
to accept such opposed pairs. 61 Thus, for example, modernists often
declare that either we have objective knowledge-that is, knowledge
grounded on some firm foundation-or we are relegated to free-
floating subjectivism and relativism. Likewise, some modernists
maintain that either we must be independent subjects with freedom
of will or we must be no more than completely determined automa-
tons. Indeed, these types of binary oppositions, to a great degree,
epitomize and animate the modernist world view. Consequently,
when a modernist describes postmodernism, the modernist natu-
rally tends to characterize the postmodern position in accordance
with these binary oppositions. The modernist then seems to reject
57. See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657 (1997); Tracy
E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex" Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1536 (1995).
58. See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992).
59. See, e.g., Feldman, Politics, supra note 5, at 169-201 (criticizing the work of both Balkin
and Patterson).
60. Of course, the same problem appears in reverse. That is, postmodernists tend to portray
modernists in postmodern terms or categories, which the modernists tend to reject.
61. See CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM 74 (1990) (discussing
a "kind of typecast binary thinking" in modernist thought).
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justifiably the postmodern view because, of course, it appears to fall
on the wrong side of the either/or.
Ronald Dworkin uses this precise type of argument to attack
postmodernism. He insists that a true proposition must be objec-
tively true, or it is no truth at all. Therefore, according to Dworkin,
either postmodernists must tacitly assume the objective truth of
their own beliefs (particularly regarding the truth of the postmod-
ern world view), or they must offer their views as no more than
"subjective displays."62 From Dworkin's modernist perspective, no
sensible thinker would try to demonstrate the truth of her posi-
tion-such as postmodernism-only to admit that it was merely a
personal statement of subjective beliefs. Hence, postmodernists
unwittingly manifest their own commitment to modernist objectiv-
ity, to "have discovered out there.., some external, objective, time-
less, mind-independent world."63
The weakness with Dworkin's and related attacks on post-
modernism is that they do not confront postmodernism on its own
terms. As already discussed, postmodernists do not rely on binary
oppositions. Instead, they seek to deconstruct the ordinary privileg-
ing between opposed pairs. At best, modernists criticize a caricature
of postmodernism, drawn with a modernist pen, rather than the
actual postmodern world view. Modernists must directly confront,
for instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer and his jurisprudential follow-
ers, such as Mootz and William Eskridge, who present a philosophi-
cal hermeneutics that purportedly explains how we have truth and
knowledge without accepting the modernist demand for objectiv-
ity.64 To be sure, Gadamer's views have weaknesses, as Jiirgen
Habermas has demonstrated,65 but to label all postmodernists as
subjectivists or relativists, without serious analysis of postmodern
positions, is far from persuasive.
62. Dworkin, supra note 17, at 88.
63. Id. at 87.
64. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990) (relying on Gadamer to help explain statutory interpretation); Mootz,
supra note 41 (explaining the rule of law from a Gadamerian approach); see also Stephen M.
Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 IOWA L REV. 661
(1991) (explaining constitutional interpretation from a Gadamerian perspective).
65. See Jfirgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in JOSEF BLEIcHER,
CONTE_ PORARYHERMENEUTICS 181 (1980) (criticizing Gadamer).
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III. CONCLUSION: LIVING AND LOVING THE POSTMODERN
So far, I have grouped Arrow with other modernist critics of
postmodern legal thought, but he differs from the others in one im-
portant way. Namely, Arrow's style of critique is somewhat origi-
nal. It is postmodern, or a parody of postmodernism, or at least Ar-
row thinks as much. So now, Arrow's hidden affection for postmod-
ernism can be uncovered. Who could write a 230-page parody of a
distinctive type of scholarship if he or she did not find something
inherently fascinating about that scholarship? Indeed, would
Michigan Law Review ever publish in the style of Arrow's Pomo-
babble article-an ostensible parody consisting primarily of non-
sensical footnotes-if not for the significance and widespread accep-
tance of postmodern scholarship? The lifeblood of Arrow's article is
postmodernism itself. Maybe he does not so much want to kill
postmodernism as to revel in its style, in its playfulness, in its free-
dom-even if he does not truly understand it. If he were not so in-
tent on cynically expressing his disdain for postmodernism, he
might recognize and acknowledge his affection for it.
But why would Arrow have such a latent affinity for post-
modernism when he overtly dislikes it? One possible explanation
for this paradox is the pervasive effect of postmodern culture it-
self.66 Postmodernism, as a term, has multiple meanings. It some-
times refers to a theory (or theories) that encompasses a set of phi-
losophical ideas or themes, such as the rejection of objective founda-
tions for knowledge.67 Yet, postmodernism also sometimes refers to
a cultural trend or movement that closely interrelates with post-
modern theory but nonetheless can be comprehended separately
from the philosophical themes.
68
66. See generally the following sources with helpful discussions of postmodernism:
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY (1992); STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER,
POSTMODERN THEORY (1991); STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989); NANCY
FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL
THEORY (1989); DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1989); FREDRIC JAMESON,
POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991); BARBARA KRUGER,
REMOTE CONTROL: POWER, CULTURES, AND THE WORLD OF APPEARANCES (1993); JEAN-FRANgoIS
LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian
Massumi trans., 1984); NORRIS, supra note 61; Litowitz, supra note 54.
67. See, e.g., BEST & KELLNER, supra note 66 (focusing on postmodern theory); FELDMAN,
VOYAGE, supra note 4, at 38-45 (specifying eight postmodern themes).
68. Connor distinguishes the culture of postmodernism from the social, economic, and po-
litical arrangements of postmodernity. See CONNOR, supra note 66, at 27. Douglas Litowitz de-
scribes postmodernism at three levels: art, culture, and philosophy. Litowitz, supra note 54, at
41-42.
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What is postmodern culture? As many scholars have noted,
and I am sure to the chagrin of Arrow, there is no one simple defini-
tion.69 Some commentators emphasize the fragmentation of society.
Zygmunt Bauman argues that postmodernism is "the permanent
and irreducible pluralism of cultures, communal traditions, ideolo-
gies, 'forms of life' or 'language games' . . .. [Ihe problem of the
postmodern world is not how to globalize superior culture, but how
to secure communication and mutual understanding between cul-
tures."70 Fredric Jameson, meanwhile, ties postmodern culture to
the capitalist economy. "[A]esthetic production today has become
integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic eco-
nomic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming
goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover,
now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and posi-
tion to aesthetic innovation and experimentation."71 Information
and knowledge are produced and spread at dizzying speeds through
television, satellite beamings, and computer technology. Conse-
quently, postmodernism "is characterized by the overabundance of
meanings, coupled with (or made all the more salient by) the scar-
city of adjudicating authorities."72 Often, knowledge seems to have
no deeper roots, no firmer foundations, than the images flashing
across your computer monitor as you surf the web, leaping from hy-
perlink to hyperlink over your broadband.
73
69. Fredric Jameson writes:
[]he concept [of postmodernism] is not merely contested, it is also internally
conflicted and contradictory. I will argue that, for good or ill, we cannot not use
it. But my argument should also be taken to imply that every time it is used, we
are under the obligation to rehearse those inner contradictions and to stage
those representational inconsistencies and dilemmas; we have to work all that
through every time around. Postmodernism is not something we can settle once
and for all and then use with a clear conscience.
JAMESON, supra note 66, at xxii.
Barbara Kruger suggests different ways to describe postmodernism:
To some [postmodernism is] an excuse to pile together oodles of wild and crazy
decor, to others it's another example of the weakening of standards and values,
to others a transgressive resistance to the sureness of categories, to others a
handy way to describe a particular house, dress, car, artist, dessert, or pet, and
to others it's simply already over.
KRUGER, supra note 66, at 3.
70. BAUMiAN, supra note 66, at 102.
71. JAMIESON, supra note 66, at 4-5.
72. BAUMAN, supra note 66, at 31.
73. The legal scholar, James Boyle, offers another definition ofpostmodern culture:
The cultural form, which I shall refer to as "pomo," is built on kitsch quotation
and the flight from ponderous sincerity, on the juxtaposition of contradictory
styles and modes so that each impliedly mocks the other without any assistance
from the "speaker," on the use of tension and internal inconsistency to make a
point. Pomo celebrates the co-optation of'50s soap operas as markers for forms
of sexuality sternly denied during the '50s. It glorifies the parodic personality
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Regardless of the nebulous character of postmodern culture,
most postmodernists would agree with Jameson's observation that
"we are within the culture of postmodernism to the point where its
facile repudiation is as impossible as any equally facile celebration
of it is complacent and corrupt."74 If so, then even modernist legal
scholars, including Arrow, are living within postmodern culture,
whether they like it or not. Moreover, according to Jameson, culture
has expanded "throughout the social realm, to the point at which
everything in our social life-from economic value and state power
to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself-can be
said to have become 'cultural.' "75 Postmodern culture, in other
words, permeates all aspects of our lives, including the writing of
theory. As already mentioned, therefore, postmodern culture and
theory are interrelated. More specifically, the culture seems to en-
gender the theorizing. For instance, the pluralism of cultures has
spurred postmodern theorists to recognize that ostensibly settled
truths often reflect the tacit acceptance of a dominant cultural
standpoint. But when alternative cultures or subcultures are recog-
nized, then alternative truths start to emerge. Postmodern theo-
rists thus stress the theme of antifoundationalism: that truth and
knowledge are not grounded on an objective foundation.7 6
Because of the pervasiveness of postmodern culture, post-
modern themes or theoretical insights have surfaced in the most
unexpected places: namely, in modernist legal writing and even in
the politically conservative opinions of Supreme Court Justices. 77
Among modernist legal scholars, Cass Sunstein has explicitly con-
demned "postmodern nonsense," 78 yet he readily uses postmodern
and the sardonic aside, or the incongruity between the three-piece suit and the
eyebrow ring. Above all, pomo is the world of irony, irony, irony.
James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice, 51
STAN. L. REV. 493, 497-98 (1999).
74. JAMESON, supra note 66, at 62.
75. Id. at 48; see CONNOR, supra note 66, at 44-51 (stating that culture, social practices, and
their discussion in theory often merge together or conjoin).
76. FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 4, at 38-39.
77. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Ele.
phant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673 (2000) (arguing that various postmodern themes have appeared in
Supreme Court opinions). For a more extensive discussion of the social and cultural factors that
contributed to the emergence of postmodern legal thought, see FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 4,
at 137-62.
78. In a book review, Sunstein declares that, from one perspective, the book's author is "at
risk of speaking postmodern nonsense." Cass R. Sunstein, More Is Less, NEW REPUBLIC, May 18,
1998, at 32, 36 (reviewing JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998)). To Sunstein, apparently, postmodernism
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insights in the course of his modernist constitutional arguments. In
criticizing the interpretive claims of originalists such as Robert
Bork, 79 Sunstein writes: "There is simply no such thing as preinter-
pretive meaning, or meaning without resort to interpretive princi-
ples."80 Sunstein, like an inspired postmodernist, explains that in-
terpretation is "inevitably situated," never resting on "external
foundations."8 '
Unsurprisingly, then, postmodern culture appears to have
also infused Arrow's writing with postmodern or pseudo-
postmodern themes. For instance, as already discussed, we find Ar-
row deconstructing the normal privileging of text over footnotes.
Arrow also seems to subscribe to the postmodern critique of norma-
tiveness. He seeks to transform legal scholarship-to eradicate
postmodern themes-yet he ironically writes as a postmodernist,
refusing to conclude with an overt recommendation for change.8 2
Furthermore, Arrow's extensive citation of nonlegal sources in his
footnotes resonates with the postmodern tendency to question and
defy commonly accepted boundaries, including those dividing aca-
demic disciplines. Postmodern legal scholars often cite nonlegal
sources and generally do interdisciplinary work because they find
the constraints of the traditional discipline of law too confining and
artificial. Perhaps, postmodernists suggest, insights from history,
philosophy, political science, or other disciplines can be fruitfully
imported into legal thought.83
Of course, Arrow does not actually consider the worthiness of
interdisciplinary legal studies, so his citations offer only grotesque
mockeries of true postmodern efforts to glean insights from other
disciplines. Arrow's parodic dismissal of interdisciplinary postmod-
ern scholarship, coupled with his pronouncement that postmodern-
ism is already a joke within the legal academy, is truly remarkable.
Only three years before Arrow declared postmodernism a joke,
equates with nonsense. The book's author, Sunstein suggests, could not have intended any such
postmodern meaning: after all, who would want to speak nonsense?
79. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 3-5 (1990).
80. CASSR. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 8 (1993).
81. Id. at 115. Sunstein adds: "The meaning of any text, including the Constitution, is inevi-
tably and always a function of interpretive principles, and these are inevitably and always a
product of substantive commitments." Id. at 8.
82. Toward the end of Arrow's second article, he does offer, in his words, "a modest pro-
posal." Arrow, Nuanced, supra note 2, at 169-70. Yet, his proposal is just further mockery. He
proposes that whenever a professor publishes a constitutional law article, the new article be
accompanied by a special footnote that would rate the professor's previous articles on a
"Messianism Exponent," showing how radical or reactionary those articles had been.




Balkin wrote: "[I]nterdisciphnary scholarship seems to be all the
rage. Interdisciplinary scholarship is now an expected part of a se-
rious scholar's work at most of the elite law schools in this coun-
try."8 4 Did interdisciplinary postmodern scholarship go from being
the rage to a joke in three short years? Not likely. The steady flow
of interesting interdisciplinary scholarship, both before and after
Arrow's articles were published, supports Balkin's rather than Ar-
row's viewpoint. 85
Moreover, for what it's worth, interdisciplinary legal schol-
arship is not unique to the postmodern era. As is commonly known,
many American legal realists, drawing extensively on the empirical
social sciences, engaged in interdisciplinary scholarship during the
1930s.8 6 Although perhaps less commonly known, the earliest
American legal scholars, such as James Wilson and Nathaniel
Chipman, also freely did interdisciplinary work.8 7 Wilson's lectures
from the 1790s on constitutional law, for example, "ranged widely
in their observations and theories on human nature, morality, his-
tory, government, law, and more."88 David Hoffman's Course of Le-
84. J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 950
(1996). Balkin continued by explaining that interdisciplinary scholarship was creating divisions
among faculty at nonelite schools. Id. at 951. In 1992, Peter C. Schanck observed: "Notwithstand-
ing its vilification in the popular media, postmodern theory has been accepted almost unani-
mously by legal theorists in the past decade." Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern
Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2512-13
(1992).
85. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 73; Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (2000);
L6pez, supra note 30.
86. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas & J. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy
Administration and Some Suggestions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 25 (1932); Underhill Moore & Gilbert
Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts-Ill. The
Connecticut Studies, 40 YALE L.J. 752 (1931). Compare JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 20, 211 (1995) (discussing the empirical work of
realists but arguing that the movement had largely ended by 1939), with LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 145-87 (1986) (arguing that realism remained important after
World War II).
Even Henry Hart, Jr., and Albert Sacks included a lengthy excerpt on legal hermeneutics
from the nineteenth-century German writer, Francis Lieber, in their course materials from the
1950s on the legal process. HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1114-15 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994). I thank Jay Mootz for bringing to my attention this example of interdisci.
plinary work in the legal process writing.
87. See NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT: A TREATISE ON FREE
INSTITUTIONS (Burlington, Vt., Edward Smith 1833); NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (Rutland, Vt., J. Lyon 1793); JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON (Robert Green McCloskey ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1804).
88. FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 4, at 5; see MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON, 1742-1798, at 68-69 (1997) (explaining how James Wilson
was influenced by David Hume and Adam Smith).
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gal Study, a self-help guide to studying law from the early 1800s,
recommended that students read sources as diverse as Aristotle,
Francis Bacon, Jeremy Bentham, and the Bible.8 A narrower ap-
proach to legal scholarship, solely focused on ostensibly pure law
without interdisciplinary considerations, arose during the latter
nineteenth century partly because of the professionalization of the
legal academic. To justify the place of law schools in the emergent
research universities of that time, law professors needed to engage
in supposedly scientific research in a distinctive discipline-
namely, the law.90 If legal research were little more than a type of
history, philosophy, or some other discipline, then law schools
would have no place in the universities. Lawyers could instead be
trained through apprenticeships or in craft-oriented and independ-
ent law schools, and law could be studied from a scholarly perspec-
tive in the appropriate discipline, whether history, philosophy, or
whatever. From a postmodern standpoint, today's modernist schol-
ars who rage against interdisciplinary scholarship largely attempt
to police the borders of the legal discipline that developed as much
for purposes of professionalization as for scholarly or intellectual
insight.9 1
Finally, in a spirit of communal good will and comity, I sug-
gest a refinement of terminology for both modernists and postmod-
ernists alike. My primary purpose, though, is to forestall the type of
precipitative denunciations of postmodernism that so regularly is-
sue from modernists. In light of their fondness for normative rec-
ommendations, I am confident that modernists will give my sugges-
tion the attention it deserves, and, accordingly, they will soon be
invoking my terminology (and citing this Essay).
In particular, I propose that postmodern theory be divided
into two types: antimodernism and metamodernism.9 2 As between
these two types, antimodernism is the more extreme; it encom-
89. See DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDETS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836); DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF
LEGAL STUDY: RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED TO THE STUDENTS OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
(1817).
90. See FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 4, at 92-93 (discussing the development of univer-
sity-based law schools in the latter nineteenth century); WILLIA. P. LAPIANA. LOGIC AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 14-28, 79-109 (1994) (focus-
ing on the development of Harvard Law School in the latter nineteenth century).
91. I do not mean to suggest that disciplinary boundaries do not have any value. I agree
that specialization sometimes yields greater insight into intellectual problems. But just as
surely, disciplinary boundaries and specialization can also sometimes generate obstacles to in-
sight, such as parochialism and the creation of professional jargon.
92. Cf. STEVEN BEST AND DOUGLAS KELLNER, THE POSTMODERN TURN 258 (1997) (distin-
guishing between "extreme" and "reconstructive" postmodernists).
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passes a belief in radical relativism. Appeals to reason are, accord-
ing to antimodernists, no more than rhetorical moves that assert
the dominance of one's own cultural standpoint. There is no way to
adjudicate among competing claims to truth and knowledge. When
it comes to textual interpretation, anything goes. Perhaps, then, the
deconstructive writings of some literary theorists can be fairly
characterized as antimodern. Harold Bloom, for instance, writes
that "[e]ither one can believe in a magical theory of all language...
or else one must yield to a thoroughgoing linguistic nihilism."93 Re-
gardless of who might or might not fall within antimodernism, as
defined, it unequivocally encompasses the manifestations of post-
modernism that most often provoke the ire of so many modernist
critics. 9
4
Metamodernism, meanwhile, is the more moderate type of
postmodernism. Like modernists, metamodernists might explain,
for example, how we use reason, have knowledge, and discuss truth.
Metamodernists, however, explain these concepts without invoking
the firm objective epistemological foundations of modernist meta-
physics. Metamodernists tend to emphasize our situatedness: we
are always situated in a communal or cultural context. And it is our
situatedness-our participation in communal traditions-that en-
ables us to perceive and understand in the first place, while simul-
taneously limiting our perception and understanding. 9 A metamod-
ernist, therefore, would never suggest that anything goes, because
we always are necessarily constrained, since we always are situ-
ated.96
93. Harold Bloom, The Breaking of Form, in DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 1, 4 (1979).
94. Among continental thinkers, Jean-Francois Lyotard might be regarded as an antimod-
ernist, as he "resolutely champions a plurality of discourses and positions against unifying the-
ory." BEST & KELLNER, supra note 66, at 147. Yet, Lyotard expressly focuses on the problematic
nature of justice in the postmodern condition. While he does not reach'any definitive conclusion
on the definition of justice, he does reject the idea that justice is "merely unanimous convention."
JEAN-FRANOIs LYOTARD & JEAN-LOUP TH]kBAUD, JUST GAMING 81 (Wlad Godzich trans., 1985).
Moreover, contrary to antimodernism, he asserts that "it is neither unthinkable nor absurd to
think that one can have relative certainty in matters of truth." Id. at 99.
Of particular note, despite his many critics, Derrida would be miscast as an antimodernist.
For instance, he rejects the possibility of "complete freeplay or undecidability." JACQUES
DERRIDA, LIMITED INC. 115 (Samuel Weber trans., 1988). Plus, he has "never accepted saying, or
encouraging others to say, just anything at all, nor have I argued for indeterminacy as such." Id.
at 145.
95. See GADAMER, supra note 64, at 265-492 (explaining philosophical hermeneutics).
96. My division of postmodernism into antimodernism and metamodernism somewhat ech.
oes a long-running debate over progressive critical writing. Some authors believe that such writ-
ing can be as clear as any other type of writing, while others insist that such writing must be
obscure exactly because it challenges the assumptions that underlie the dominant culture, in.
cluding the language. See James Miller, Is Bad Writing Necessary? George Orwell, Theodor
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Understanding the differences between alternative interpre-
tations of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science can help clarify the
distinction between metamodernism and antimodernism. Kuhn ar-
gued that, according to a traditional view of science, scientific prac-
tice is objective, mechanistic, and progresses in a linear fashion:
scientists supposedly progress in their knowledge of nature as they
develop theories based on the neutral observation of brute objective
data. Kuhn repudiated this traditional view. He argued that scien-
tists instead understand or interpret the world in accordance with
or through a paradigm. The scientific community's paradigm shapes
the questions that scientists find interesting and appropriate for
research, and even more important, the paradigm shapes the scien-
tists' perceptions of data. Kuhn, therefore, suggested that science
might progress by becoming more complex and specialized as it
moves from one paradigm to another, but contrary to the traditional
view, science does not necessarily move closer and closer to some
objective truth.97
Kuhn's argument is subject to two strongly opposed read-
ings. According to one interpretation of Kuhn, he is an antimodern-
ist. His repudiation of the traditional view of science and his focus
on scientific paradigms renders true science impossible. Science
becomes, at most, a culturally relativistic practice, and at worst, a
practice in which anything goes. According to a second interpreta-
tion, however, Kuhn is a metamodernist. He explains exactly how
science is possible, even though-we cannot meaningfully access any
type of brute data. When a scientist participates in a communal
paradigm, she is, in a sense, equipped with tools that enable her to
practice science. She knows what questions are interesting, how to
search for data, how to present findings, and so forth.
To me, the better interpretation of Kuhn is the second, or
metamodernist, one. Moreover, the same metamodernist approach
ought to be applied to law and jurisprudence. I would, in fact, dis-
agree just as strongly with an antimodernist legal scholar as I
would with a modernist scholar on most issues. The only problem-
and it is an important one-is that I have a hard time identifying
any antimodern legal scholar. As I already stated, perhaps some
literary deconstructionists are antimodern, but who, among legal
scholars, is a nihilist who believes that anything goes? Most of the
Adorno, and the Politics of Language, LINGUA FRANCA, Dec.-Jan. 2000, at 33. Perhaps, as a very
rough approximation, it would be possible to fit antimodernists into the obscure camp and
metamodernists into the clear camp.
97. See THOmAiS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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postmodern legal scholars that I have mentioned in this Essay are
unequivocally metamodern rather than antimodern. Writers such
as Mootz or Patterson dwell more on the constraints than the free-
doms of legal interpretation. To be sure, if one pulls isolated
phrases out of context, different writers might be cast in an anti-
modernist light. But if one fairly reads Mootz, Patterson, and oth-
ers, they believe in truth, knowledge, merit, reason, and so forth.
Well, what about Stanley Fish? Isn't he an antimodernist?
Maybe the early Fish, the literary critic who proclaimed himself to
be a reader response theorist, might have been an antimodernist. 98
But the later Fish, who has written extensively on law and juris-
prudence, consistently stresses the constraints imposed on readers.
Those constraints arise because we belong to and participate in in-
terpretive communities, which provide us with "a way of thinking, a
form of life, [that] shares us, and implicates us in a world of al-
ready-in-place objects, purposes, goals, procedures, values, and so
on . . . ."9 Reading is never a matter of anything goes, according to
Fish. The "independent and freely interpreting reader"'100 is uni-
maginable because "already-in-place interpretive constructs are a
condition of consciousness." '0'
How about Richard Delgado? After all, Arrow cites him for
maintaining that "merit in legal scholarship was 'potentially hostile
to the idea of voice.' "102 Delgado, here, definitely overstates his po-
sition so that his words, taken out of context, suggest an antimod-
ernist stance: that we cannot legitimately compare the merits of
various scholarly positions. Yet, if one examines the context of
Delgado's statement, his meaning seems less extreme. His point is
that the criteria used to judge merit are often culturally specific
values that are mislabeled or disguised as objective universals. 10 3
Thus, according to Delgado, if we are to evaluate the merits of
scholarship, we need to develop and apply relevant standards-and
to do so cautiously. We need to ask: "Are the standards or criteria
appropriate to this particular context?" Indeed, any reader who ex-
98. On reader response theory and Fish's transitions, see JONATHAN CULLER, ON
DECONSTRUCTION 64-78 (1982).
99. STANLEY FISH, Is There a Text in This Class?, in Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 303,
303-04 (1980).
100. Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary
Criticism, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 271, 281-82 (W. Mitchell ed., 1983).
101. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1795 (1987).
102. Arrow, Pomobabble, supra note 2, at 472 (quoting Richard Delgado, When a Story Is
Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 100 (1990)).
103. See Delgado, supra note 102, at 100-02.
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amines the corpus of Delgado's writing could never reasonably con-
clude that he is a nihilist lacking convictions, believing that all po-
sitions are equally good (or bad). To the contrary, throughout his
career, Delgado has taken strong and controversial scholarly posi-
tions and has explained them adroitly. His frequent law review ex-
changes with other writers demonstrate his belief that scholarly
positions can be criticized and defended based on reasoned
grounds. 10 To Delgado, then, we can discuss merit. We just need to
realize that merit is not based on objective or universal criteria but
rather "is a group-defined term."10 5
Well, then, where are all the antimodernists? Hey, how
about Dennis Arrow? More than any other legal scholar, he seems
willing to adopt scholarly positions without giving or explaining his
reasons. His Pomobabble article, more than any other piece, sug-
gests that anything goes when it comes to law review publishing-
or at least that anything can be accepted for publication, even at
Michigan Law Review. More than anyone else, Arrow seems intent
on forcing his cultural world view on others through mockery and
bullying tactics rather than through persuasion. But ultimately,
even Arrow cannot fairly be categorized as an antimodern legal
scholar. He is not a nihilist. He certainly has particular values that
he seeks to uphold in legal scholarship. After all, that is the point of
his attack on postmodern writing, however ill conceived that attack
might be.
Finally, regardless of modernist rantings and denunciations,
postmodern legal scholarship will continue, whether it goes by the
name of metamodernism, postmodernism, or something else. The
reason, once again, is culture. Douglas Litowitz suggests that post-
modern culture "is the result of two forces that have coalesced in
the last twenty years: (i) the interconnection of diverse cultures via
the media (e.g., television, video, and the Internet), and (ii) the
move toward a fast, information-driven, global economy."0 s These
forces, quite obviously, are beyond the ready control of law profes-
sors, whether they be modernists or postmodernists. The long and
short of it, then, is that postmodern culture is not going away any-
time soon. Postmodern culture, therefore, will continue to infuse
legal scholarship, producing postmodern theory. So, to some degree,
104. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L REV. 1872 (1990) (re-
sponding to Randall Kennedy); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in Schoo. A Reply to Farber
and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993) (responding to Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry).
105. Delgado, supra note 102, at 102.
106. Litowitz, supra note 54, at 43.
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the attacks of the modernist critics on postmodernism are beside
the point. Postmodern or, more precisely, metamodern legal schol-
arship lives, even as horrified yet fascinated modernist scholars,
like Arrow, declare its death. 107
107. Cf. David Gray Carlson, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1908, 1953-54 (1999) (reviewing PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) and
PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
MIND (1996)) (ruminating about the future of postmodern legal scholarship).
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